From the point of view of the organisation

Managing a kidnap crisis is a changing process that can last from anywhere between a few hours and months or even years. Key issues are the mobilisation of a competent crisis management team; dealing with the family, the authorities and press; communications and negotiations with the captors.

Communicating and negotiating with the captors

Kidnapping, as understood here, is deliberate and for a purpose. The captors will usually establish contact to make clear their demands and conditions.

The crisis management team should retain control over the negotiations, but avoid making direct contact with captors; the purpose is to create a time lag to allow for internal and external consultation and decision-making. You can if nec- essary ask for proof of life and for proof of the identity of the captors, and encourage and demand good treatment of captives.

If kidnapping is a real risk, it is important to previously agree on certain rules and procedures in relation to ransom and requests from abductors, where pos- sible in line with similar organisations, and publicise them.. In any case, earlier similar events will inform about the likely stages of a kidnapping.

From the point of view of the abducted/kidnapped defender

- The most dangerous moments, when the captors will be tenser, are during the abduction, when the abductee is moved hastily because the captors fear that the authorities are near, during a siege situation and during release.

- Your captors will want you to be quiet; you may be blindfolded, beaten and even drugged for that purpose. It does not make sense to cry or struggle to oppose these tactics: actually being quiet might help you to avoid them (unless you reasonably expect that, during an abduction, crying or yelling can get other people to help you).

- The place and conditions in which abductees are held can vary widely. You may be kept in the same place or moved several times; you may be alone or with other captives. It is common for abductees to develop some sort of relationship with their guards and find it difficult to adjust as guards change.

- Obey the orders of your captors without appearing servile; avoid surprising or alarming them.

- Try to maintain physical and mental health.

- If you are in a group you should try not to be separated, as being with at least one other person can be a source of support. It is important however to be pre- pared for separation and changes, and in general for uncertainties that each day might bring and which will need to be faced.

- Securing release is not your problem but that of your organisation. Never get directly involved in negotiations for your release. This will only complicate mat- ters. If asked to talk on the radio, telephone or on video say only what you are asked or allowed to say and refuse to negotiate even if pushed to by your cap- tors.

PREVENTION PROCEDURES: REDUCING RISKS OF DETENTION OR ABDUCTION DURING A TRIP

Risks of detention or abduction are particularly high during a trip or mission because the defender is more exposed, has less contact with his/her usual sur- roundings, and those around him/her may delay reacting to a threat or attack. For this reason, we state the risks linked to a field mission include most of the threats /consequences related to the whole work of the defenders.

We would like to insist on the risk of detention / abduction during a field mission and recommend that the prevention protocol for field mission include at least:

- preparation for all missions, both in the field or to urban areas such as neighbourhoods, where relevant.

- do not travel alone.

- adequate information on the background of the area and actors to be vis- ited (actor mapping, field force analysis see chap.1.1.)

- defenders should know entrance and exit routes for the places involved.

- every person involved in the mission must hold relevant valid identity documents.

- alert the organisational emergency contacts who are on standby during the whole field mission (from the moment it leaves until the moment it is

back)

- prepare the mission in accordance with procedures: include the agenda and work to be carried out, and it should also form part of the organisa- tional security manual.

- plan regular updates on the state of the mission (usually by telephone, at times previously agreed). It implies, if possible, to check whether the route and final destination zones have got telephone reception. If it is not possible to check or there is not reception, one might consider the possi- bility of resorting to trusted people living on the way to confirm that the team has been seen by.

It is important to decide how long the designated person should remain on standby waiting for a report call after having tried unsuccessfully to reach the team, before getting worried. Remember that it is easier to reconstruct an abduction within a time frame of a few hours than many hours.

- assess the security of the chosen means of transport (this might at times be the organisation vehicle and at times public transport so as to be sur- rounded by potential witnesses). In the case of public transport, assess whether to sit together or separately and pretend not to know each other. This might give the possibility for at least one member of the team to alert the organisation. To intervene might mean losing that chance.

- If trips are made in one’s own vehicle, it should be in working order at all times (respect speed limit and traffic code). Do not pick up hitchhikers.

- where relevant, distribute appropriate information to the civilian, military and community authorities, as well as to those responsible for the mis- sion (so that they take responsibility for the safety of the mission and do not simply say that they “did not know”).

- present a prepared argument that explains the aims and mandate of the organisation, in a way that is as acceptable as possible to armed groups and security forces (it is better not to adapt the argument to the armed group faced, as it may be difficult to identify who they are and it would be easy to make a grave mistake).

- assess the best time to leave for the field (at times, because of hot weath- er, it may be preferable to leave at dawn regardless of security). In the event of an attack right after leaving for the field however, the organisa- tional emergency contacts might not yet be operational; the first mo- ments after an abduction are crucial in being able to keep track of the person.

- Do not travel after dark.

- Do not at any time obviously display valuable items (such as cameras or video cameras).

- Behave appropriately during the trip.

- Usually, get the organisation to obtain permission for the community visited (and where possible to negotiate at least tolerance from armed groups).

In the case of a field mission following a call from a third party, also:

- Be sure of the identity of the caller (cross-check with trusted organisa- tions)

- Cross check details about events mentioned

- assess whether it is important to actually go to the field or if it would not be safer for all if the information were to travel to the organisation (see information management: prevention and reaction protocol)

- assess whether is necessary to go there and then, right after the call, especially if the calling person is unknown (information should at least be cross-checked first). Also, one ought to consider that the field mis- sion is not going to prevent the events as they have already happened, hence the initial call. In general, the best advice is to avoid improvisa- tion and changes in plans whilst visiting a risky area.