• Geographical, physical and technical components
• Components linked to conflict
  
• Components linked to the legal and political system
• Management of information
• Social and organisational components
  
• Psychological Components (Group/Individuals)
  
• Work resources
  
• Access to national and international contacts and media

 
COMPONENTS OF VULNERABILITIES AND CAPACITIES
INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSESS THE VULNERABILITIES OR CAPACITIES OF THOSE COMPONENTS.

NOTE: Generally speaking, the information from the heading may show that a given component -explanation underneath- is either a vulnerability or a capacity of a given defender or group of defenders.

Exposure
The need to be in, or to pass through, dangerous areas to carry out normal daily or occasional activities. Threatening actors in those areas.

Physical structures
The characteristics of housing (offices, homes, shelters); building materials, doors, windows, cupboards. Protective barriers. Night lights.

Offices and places open to public
Are your offices open to visitors from the general public? Are there areas reserved only for personnel? Do you have to deal with unknown people that come to your place?

Hiding places, escape routes
Are there any hiding places? How accessible are they (physical distance) and to whom (for specific individuals or the whole group)? Can you leave the area for a while if necessary?

Access to the area
How difficult is it for outside visitors (government officials, NGOs, etc,) to access the area, for example in a dangerous neighbourhood? How difficult is access for threatening actors?

Transport and accommodation
Do defenders have access to safe transportation (public or private)? Do these have particular advantages or disadvantages? Do defenders have access to safe accommodation when travelling?

Communication
Are telecommunications systems in place (radio, telephone)? Do defenders have easy access to them? Do they work properly at all times? Can they be cut by threatening actors before an attack?




Links to conflict parties
Do defenders have links with conflict parties (relatives, from the same area, same interests) that could be unfairly used against the defenders?

Defenders’ activities affecting a conflict party
Do defenders´ work directly affect an actor’s interests? (For example, when protecting valuable natural resources, the right to land, or similar potential targets for powerful actors.) do you work on a specially sensitive issue for powerful actors? (such as land ownership, for example)

Transportation of items and goods and written information
Do defenders have items or goods that could be valuable to armed groups, and therefore increase the risk of targeting? (Petrol, humanitarian aid, batteries, human rights manuals, health manuals, etc.)

Knowledge about fighting and mined areas
Do you have information about the fighting areas that could put you at risk? And about safe areas to help your security? Do you have reliable information about mined areas?




Access to authorities and to a legal system to claim your rights
Can defenders start legal processes to claim their rights? (Access to legal representation, physical presence at trials or meetings, etc.) Can defenders gain appropriate assistance from relevant authorities towards their work and protection needs?

Ability to get results from the legal system and from authorities
Are defenders legally entitled to claim their rights? Or are they subjects to repressive internal laws? Can they gain enough clout to make authorities take note of their claims?

Registration, capacity to keep accounts and legal standards
Are defenders denied legal registration or subjected to long delays? Is their organisation able to keep proper accounts and meet national legal standards? Do you use pirate computer software?




Sources and accuracy of information
Do defenders have reliable sources of information to base accusations on? Do defenders publicise information with the necessary accuracy and method?

Keeping, sending and receiving information
Can defenders keep information in a safe and reliable place? Could it get stolen? Can it be protected from viruses and hackers? Can you send and receive information safely?

Being witnesses or having key information
Are defenders key witnesses to raise charges against a powerful actor? Do defenders have relevant and unique information for a given case or process?

Having coherent and acceptable explanation about your work and aims
Do the defenders have a clear, sustainable and coherent explanation of their work and objectives? Is this explanation acceptable, or at least tolerated, by most/all stakeholders (specially armed ones)? Are all members of the group able to provide this explanation when requested?


Existence of a group structure
Is the group structured or organised in any way? Does this structure provide an acceptable level of cohesiveness to the group?

Ability to make joint decisions
Does the group’s structure reflect particular interests or represent the whole group (extent of membership)? Are the main responsibilities carried out and decision-making done by only one or a few people? Are back-up systems in place for decision-making and responsibilities? To what degree is decision-making participatory? Does the group’s structure allow for: a) joint decision making and implementation, b) discussing issues together, c) sporadic, ineffective meetings, d) none of the above?

Security plans and procedures
Are security rules and procedures in place? Is there a broad understanding and ownership of security procedures? Do people follow the security rules?

Security management outside of work (family and free time)
How do defenders manage their time outside of work (family and free time)? Alcohol and drug use represent great vulnerabilities. Relationships can also result in vulnerabilities (as well as strengths)

Working conditions
Are there proper work contracts for everyone? Is there access to emergency funds? Insurances?

Recruiting people
Do you have proper procedures for recruiting personnel or collaborators or members? Do you have a specific security approach for your occasional volunteers (such as students, for example) or visitors to your organization?

Working with people or with interface organizations
Is your work done directly with people? Do you know these people well? Do you work with an organization as an interface for your work with people?

Taking care of witness or victims we work with
Do we assess the risk of victims and witnesses, etc, when we are working on specific cases? Do we have specific security measures when we meet them or when they come to our office? If they receive threats, how do we react?

Neighbourhood and social surroundings
Are defenders well socially integrated in the local area? Do some social groups see defenders´ work as good or harmful? Are defenders surrounded by potentially hostile people (neighbours as informers, for example)?

Mobilization capacity
Are defenders able to mobilize people for public activities?


Ability to manage stress and fear
Do key individuals, or the group as a whole, feel confident about their work? Do people clearly express feelings of unity and joint purpose (in both words and action)? Are stress levels undermining good communications and interpersonal relationships?

Deep feelings of pessimism or persecution
Are feelings of depression and loss of hope being clearly expressed (in both words and action)?

Ability to understand work context and risk
Do defenders have access to accurate information about their working environment, other stakeholders and their interests? Are defenders able to process that information and get an understanding of threats, vulnerabilities and capacities?

Ability to define action plans
Can defenders define and, in particular, implement action plans? Are there previous examples of this?

Ability to obtain advice from well informed sources
Can the group obtain reliable advice? From the right sources? Can the group make independent choices about which sources to use? Do you have access to particular organisations or membership status that enhances your protection capacities?

People and amount of work
Do the people or personnel available match the amount of work needed? Can you plan field visits in teams (at least two people)? Financial resources Do you have enough financial resources for your security? Can you manage cash in a safe way?

Knowledge about languages and areas
Do you know the languages needed for the work in this area? D you know the area properly? (roads, villages, public phones, health centres, etc)


Access to national and international networks
Do defenders have national and international contacts? To visiting delegations, embassies, other governments, etc? To community leaders, religious leaders, other people of influence? Can you issue urgent actions via other groups?

Access to media and ability to obtains results from them
Do defenders have access to media (national, international)? To other media (independent media)? Do defenders know how to manage media relations properly?